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In the past several years, greater exploitation of information technology to increase
leverage of information has become a central focus in the military. This focus is reflected in
a number of strategic vision documents. Two significant examples are "Joint Vision 2010"
signed in 1996 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report. Achieving and using information superiority is seen as essential to
future military success. This has led to the emergence of a new warfare paradigm: network-
centric warfare.
Towards this end, the Navy's service-wide IT improvement initiative is Information
Technology for the 21 st Century (IT-21). IT-21 establishes a standard for IT capability to be
achieved throughout the Navy within which Navy units can shape their IT improvements.
This study explores a requirements-approach for planning improvement ofIT through
IT-21. Specifically, it focuses on a single function of one squadron: flight scheduling in
Patrol Squadron 40. This study addresses how to establish information requirements, assess
current IT performance, and formulate specifications by which to drive planning for IT
improvement. It concludes by mapping IT-21 components to requirements to provide VP-40






C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 4




E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 7




2. IT-21 Overview 11
3. Standards 13
4. Information Superiority is More than Just Good IT 13
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING IT IMPROVEMENT 15
D. VP-40'S NEED FOR IT 15
1. The Assessment Process 16
2. Assessment Results 16
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 18
vii
III. ILLUSTRATIVE IT IMPROVEMENT: VP-40 FLIGHT SCHEDULING 19
A. INTRODUCTION 19
B. FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS 19
1. Background 19
2. What Shapes a Squadron's Schedule 20
3. Prominent Roles in Squadron Flight Scheduling 21
4. Flight Scheduling Process Overview 22
5. Complexity of Flight Scheduling for a Long-Range Maritime
Patrol Squadron 24
C. VP-40'S FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS 25
1. Logical Overview 25
2. The Physical Process 27
D. SHORTCOMINGS OF VP-40' S FLIGHT SCHEDULING
PROCESS 32
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 33
IV. INFORMATION SPECIFICATIONS FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULING IN
VP-40 35
A. INTRODUCTION 35
B. NEED FOR IT IN FLIGHT SCHEDULING 35








D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 44
V. IT-2 1 MAPPED TO THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS SPECIFI-
CATIONS FOR VP-40'S FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS 47
A. INTRODUCTION 47




C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS 53
D. CONCLUSIONS 54
APPENDIX INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE 21 st CENTURY 55
LIST OF REFERENCES 61
BIBLIOGRAPHY 63




Figure 1.1. Joint Vision 2010 Concept (DOD, 1997) 3
Figure 2.1. Transition of Information Technology (ITSG, 1998) 12
Figure 3.1. VP-40 Flight Scheduling Logical Context Diagram 26





Table 2.1. Information Quality Criteria (Joint Pub 6-0, 1995) 14
Table 2.2. Information Quality Measures (ITSG, 1998) 14
Table 4.1. Information Quality Attributes for Flight Scheduling 38






The end of the Cold War and the Soviet empire's disintegration were the
genesis for tremendous change in the United States' military. The ensuing
reductions in the United States' Armed Forces - the defense budget by 38 percent,
force structure by 33 percent, and procurement programs by 63 percent from 1985
to 1997 - were dramatic. (Cohen, 1997) Meanwhile, regional conflicts grounded
in longstanding ethnic, religious, and political hatreds emerged as the primary
threat facing the U.S. military. These combined events necessitated the U.S.
finding new and more efficient approaches to warfare.
In response, the military's leadership sought to develop a new strategic
vision by which to guide the military. In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) published "Joint Vision 2010" (JV2010), the strategic vision for the
military into the 21 st century and the conceptual template for channeling the efforts
of the Armed Forces.
In 1997 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined the new world
order and threats vis-a-vis existing defense structure. Formal recommendations
were made for changes in the Armed Forces to ensure the new threats and
unforeseen threats in the future would be decisively met. In the words of the
National Defense Panel, "if we are to be successful in meeting the challenges of
the future, the entire U.S. national security apparatus must adapt and become more
integrated, coherent, and proactive." (Cohen, 1997)
A resounding theme common to both JV2010 and the QDR Report was the
need for the military to leverage information and achieve information superiority
to ensure future success. In conjunction with the QDR, one of the National
Defense Panel's recommendations was to "exploit information technology to
integrate forces and platforms more effectively." Defense Secretary William
Cohen elaborated further in saying, "we must exploit these and other technologies
to dominate in battle." (Cohen, 1997)
Information superiority's fundamental and universal role, along with
leveraging technological opportunity, in ensuring the U.S. military's effectiveness
in joint warfighting and its dominance over enemies in the future is illustrated
within the context of JV20 1 0's concepts in Figure 1.1. Information superiority is
an equally crucial component of each of the Services' warfighting vision
documents.
Network warfare, robust information technology (IT) infrastructure and
information exchange with dispersed forces are key to achieving information
superiority. It is from this perspective that the Navy's information technology (IT)
strategy initiative, Information Technology for the 21 st Century (IT-21) was
conceived. (Clemins, 1997) "IT-21 is a fleet driven reprioritization of C4I
programs of record to accelerate the transition to a PC based tactical/tactical
support warfighting network." (CINCPACFLT, 1997) IT-21 is a joint initiative
of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
Joint Vision 2010
Figure 1.1. Joint Vision 2010 Concept (DOD, 1997)
IT-21's goal is linking U.S. and allied forces together in a network that is
capable of voice, video, and data communication from individual desktop personal
computers (PCs), thereby enabling warfighters to exchange classified or
unclassified, and tactical or non-tactical information by December 1999.
(Clemins, 1997)
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how a requirements plan can
be combined with IT-21 in a complementary fashion to improve the IT supporting
an organizational function. The thesis first examines the IT-21 initiative in the
context of its intended role in individual units of the operating fleet. Patrol
Squadron 40 (VP-40), based at Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Washington
will be used as a case study. The thesis uses the results of an on-site survey of
VP-40 that examined its IT, IT requirements and gaps between the two, which
identified a specific important function where IT is deficient: flight scheduling.
Subsequently, the thesis provides an overview of flight scheduling and IT's role
and shortcomings that function. The thesis goes on to develop IT requirements
specifications for flight scheduling and demonstrates how the requirements could
be mapped onto IT-2 1
.
A secondary objective is that this work serves as a model for similar efforts
in other functional areas in conjunction with IT-21.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Simply stated, the basic research question is how can IT-21 be
operationalized? IT-21's purpose is to facilitate achieving information superiority.
IT-21 provides hardware standards and a COTS software product set by which to
establish a network infrastructure that is key in achieving information superiority.
Is a ubiquitous IT-21 network making information accessible more widely and
quickly enough to ensure information superiority? Improving the quality of
information and the IT-based processes by which it is produced is important, too.
IT-21 does not provide a roadmap as to how its infrastructure may be used to
improve IT support of specific functions. How can IT-21 be part of IT
improvement in a single unit, in a specific function? For example, how might VP-
40 improve the IT supporting the Operations Department's flight scheduling in
conjunction with IT-21?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The subject, IT-21 implementation in fleet units, was purposely limited
because of the myriad issues associated with IT-2 1 , the quantity and diversity of
units and the many nuances unique to each. Originally, the study focused on one
unit, VP-40, and how it could incorporate IT-21 implementation into a
requirements-based IT improvement plan. Subsequently, an IT survey of the
entire squadron identified numerous functional areas desperately needing IT
improvement. Developing a complete squadron solution was deemed infeasible
given time and resource constraints. Instead, one particularly vexing and
important function for which a solution plan would have high potential payoff was
selected: flight scheduling. Furthermore, it was hoped that developing a
requirements-based IT improvement plan for one function would produce a model
for similar efforts in other squadron functions.
The scope of this thesis includes a brief examination of IT-21, an
examination of VP-40's flight scheduling process and supporting IT, specifying
the information requirements of flight scheduling, and finally, mapping those
requirements onto IT-2 1
.
2. Limitations
The foremost extraneous factor limiting the research effort was IT-21's
nascent nature. Regarding IT-21 implementation for units other than battle group
ships and the supporting shore establishment, little information existed beyond the
initial documents announcing IT-21. And even for forces afloat and the shore
establishment, formal strategies, guidance, policy, and procedures are still taking
form.
Also, sponsorship by VP-40 given its limited funding, geographic locations,
and limited availability due to training preparations for an upcoming six-month
deployment to the Western Pacific precluded were limiting.
3. Assumptions
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the Navy in general, and with the
organization and mission of a maritime patrol squadron in particular. Further it is
assumed that the reader is familiar in general terms with historical problems in IT
employment in the Navy, and with IT-21. Lastly, it is assumed the reader is
familiar with systems analysis and design as it applies in general to IT.
Several assumptions underlie the research topic. The one impacting this
thesis more than any other is that the standards jointly established by
CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT for IT-21 are fixed for the period of time in
which this thesis work was performed.
Another notable assumption is that VP-40 represents an average fleet
squadron in terms of its present state of IT and its IT requirements. Further, it was
assumed that VP-40's funding would not be increased to cover anything except the
hardware needed to comply with IT-2 1 standards. For example, VP-40 could not
afford to obtain external expertise from contractors or Department of Defense
(DOD) Working Capital Fund (WCF) activities like Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) or Naval Computer and Telecommunications Stations (NCTSs).
Also, other key resources (e.g., trained personnel) were presumed to remain
limited at present levels throughout the implementation of IT-2 1.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses the
context of VP-40's effort to improve its IT, and includes an overview of IT-2 1 and
VP-40's initiative. Chapter III describes the flight scheduling function, its
supporting IT and IT shortcomings. Chapter IV examines the information
requirements specifications of flight scheduling. Chapter V demonstrates how the
IT requirements plan for flight scheduling can be mapped onto IT-2 1 such that IT-




Spurred on by the Navy's IT-2 1 initiative and an executive officer educated
in IT management at the Naval Postgraduate School, VP-40 early in 1998 initiated
action to improve its IT. The goal was to better equip the squadron with the type
of PC-based IT commonly found in many organizations to enable VP-40 to
become more efficient, better coordinated, and more agile.
This chapter provides an overview of IT-2 1 , discusses the importance of
planning IT improvement, and finally discussesVP-40's IT.
B. IT-21
1. Origin
IT-21 is a product of fundamental changes in the U.S. military and in
technology. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
led to the reductions in U.S. military forces and funding. The smaller military
became much more reliant on once-rare joint (i.e., multi-Service) operations.
Meanwhile, numerous regional threats arose that were often difficult to predict.
With U.S. interests the world over, the military was expected to respond quickly
and effectively.
...we are operating in a paradoxical time of increased needfor our
forces, coupled with decreased resources to support them. Defense
budgets have shrunk, but the demand for our forces around the
world has grown. (Clemins, 1997)
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Concurrently, personal computers, local area networks (LANs) and the
Internet emerged as powerful means for leveraging information. Commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) PC-based IT rapidly equaled or surpassed proprietary military-
unique systems' capability and affordability.
Soon the Navy realized the substantial opportunity afforded in COTS IT to
increase efficiency and effectiveness in force employment to compensate for the
loss in sheer force size. COTS IT is now driving an ongoing fundamental change
in naval warfare. The Navy is shifting its warfare paradigm from "platform-
centric" (i.e., ship-centered), in use for over 200 years, to "network-centric."
Platform-centric warfare's characteristics are huge capital investment in
warships, large overhead in organizational structure and combat power generated
by massing forces. Under that paradigm, victory is achieved by massing
overwhelming forces against a foe to inflict unbearably high casualties upon him.
Network-centric warfare is quite different. It uses information technology
to focus and leverage information and intellectual capital to increase combat
power. Network-centric warfare requires less infrastructure and overhead. It
closes the distance between decision-makers and combatant forces, flattening the
command hierarchy and thereby fostering greater speed of command. Lulls in
operational tempo, characteristic of platform-centric warfare, due to hierarchical
decision-making are greatly reduced. The graphic analog is transforming a step-
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function into a continuous function. Reducing operational lulls means the enemy
has less opportunity to seize or regain initiative. (Dalton and Johnson, 1997)
The Navy's leadership and U.S. military leadership overall sees network-
centric warfare and information superiority as crucial to future success. This fact
is reflected in the military's overall strategic vision document for the military into
the year 2010, known as JV2010, as well as each of the Services' individual vision
documents.
2. IT-21 Overview
Information Technology for the 21 st Century, or IT-21, the joint initiative
by the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, is intended to make network-centric and
information superiority a reality. (Clemins, 1997) The efficacy of network-
centric warfare depends on information superiority. IT-21 was formally launched
on 30 March 1997.
IT-21 is not an acquisition program, but rather a strategy. It is a strategy
for reprioritizing existing command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I) programs to accelerate the Atlantic and Pacific fleets' transition
to a personal computer (PC) based tactical and support network. (Clemins, 1997)
IT-21's goal is linking U.S. forces (and eventually allied forces, too) in a network
that enables exchanging tactical or non-tactical, and classified or unclassified
information in voice, video and data formats from a single desktop PC. Figure 2.1
illustrates the infrastructure that exists today for the three information forms
"stovepipes" (i.e., isolated applications lacking interoperability with other
11
applications), must form a client-server environment, and must be based on
industry standards and COTS technology. (Clemins, 1997) This guidance for IT-
21 conforms to broader DOD IT guidance in the Joint Technical Architecture














Figure 2.1. Transition of Information Technology (ITSG, 1998)
IT-21 must be implemented rapidly. The reason is that in December 1999
the Department of Defense's (DOD's) messaging system, the Automatic Digital
Network (AUTODIN), will be deactivated. (Clemins, 1997) AUTODIN has no
follow-on system. Linked networks, electronic mail (e-mail) messaging and user




The naval message from CINCPACFLT announcing IT-21 established a set
ofminimum standards for hardware and a software product set. The details of that
message are contained in Appendix.
4. Information Superiority is More than Just Good IT
IT-21's foundation has two elements: (1) a minimum standard IT capability
for every ship and unit, and (2) a universal network linking those ships and units
across the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Together the two elements are intended to
enable network-centric warfare and information superiority. However, IT-21's
foundation alone does not necessarily produce information superiority.
Information superiority (ignoring its offensive component of direct action
against enemy information and information infrastructure such as disruption,
deception and denial) encompasses more than good accessibility to information
and the ability to achieve large-volume throughput by virtue of robust IT.
Information superiority includes information quality as well.
Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations characterizes information
quality using seven criteria: accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, usability, complete-
ness, brevity, and security. Table 2.1 defines the criteria. In other words, informa-
tion quality includes the content as well as the efficacy with which information is
produced and handled.
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Table 2.1. Information Quality Criteria (Joint Pub 6-0, 1995)
INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA
ACCURACY Information that conveys the true situation.
RELEVANCE Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at
hand.
TIMELINESS Information that is available in time to make decisions.
USABILITY Information that is in common, easily understood format
and displays.
COMPLETENESS All necessary information required by the decision-maker.
BREVITY Information that has only the level of detail required.
SECURITY Information that has been afforded adequate protection
where required.
The Navy's Information Technology Standards Guidance (ITSG) provides a
slightly different set of characteristics of information quality, as listed in Table
2.2. Good production and handling of in formation entails more than just using
superbly capable IT, it means using IT superbly. So, information superiority
demands the well-planned application of IT as well as the best information
content.
Table 2.2. Information Quality Measures (ITSG, 1998)
INFORMATION QUALITY MEASURES
ACCURACY The probability that the value is correct.
PRECISION The fidelity, granularity or relevance of the information.
CURRENCY The elapsed time from the creation, discovery or validation
of the information to the present time.
COMPLETENESS The number of information elements in the information
base as a function of the total number of information
elements in the entire set.
DUPLICATION The percentage of duplicate data elements in the
information set.
ACCESSIBILITY The degree in which the information stored or computed
within the infrastructure is available to the target
subscriber.
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING IT IMPROVEMENT
Accurately assessing the quality of existing information systems (ISs) is
important because that forms the baseline from which to plan IT improvement.
Accurate assessment requires a systematic approach. That approach begins with
identifying and defining organizational functions, then analyzing their information
management needs. Information management requirements must be precisely
defined. Then, the existing IT's efficacy and efficiency in meeting the information
management requirements must be evaluated. Capability deficiencies that are
discovered are transformed into IT requirement statements. Finally, IT require-
ments are melded into a plan for application of IT to fulfill the information
management needs.
The IT plan must be accurate and coherent to ensure appropriate,
integrated, and economical application of IT. In implementing IT-21, correct
plans are especially important. In the words of Admiral Clemins, CINCPACFLT,
in July 1997, "the year 2000 is rapidly approaching. There will be sufficient
money to implement IT-21, but there will not be enough money to do it twice. It
must be done right the first time."
D. VP-40'S NEED FOR IT
Early in 1998, the executive officer of VP-40 began an earnest effort to
increase the squadron's efficiency and effectiveness by improving the quality and
use of its IT. IT-21 figured significantly into this initiative.
15
1. The Assessment Process
VP-40 began a systematic assessment of its IT in early 1998. While
normally such an assessment would begin with identifying and defining
organization functions, this was unnecessary for VP-40. Navy ships and units have
standard organizational structures and functions (by type of ship or unit) that are
already clearly identified and well defined in manning documents and standard
operating procedures. Therefore, VP-40's attention immediately turned to
assessing how well VP-40's IT supported its functions.
In May of 1998 as part of work preliminary to this thesis, an on-site survey
of VP-40's IT was conducted. The squadron's existing IT was assessed based on
three days of visiting all functional areas of the squadron and interviewing key
personnel in each. The results of the survey were intended to help the squadron
appropriately shape its implementation of IT-21.
2. Assessment Results
PCs in use ranged between 286 microprocessors to low-end 486 processors.
Of 49 PCs in use, only 14 were connected to a squadron LAN. The LAN had been
only recently established. It was established based on Ethernet technology and a
Novell network operating system (NOS). LAN connectivity was primarily limited
to VP-40's department heads plus the commanding officer and the executive
officer.
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The squadron's primary use of PC software was for word processing,
databases and spreadsheets at department- and division-levels. Software generally
was not standardized across the squadron. Exceptions were e-mail and the naval
message distribution software.
Databases were maintained on stand-alone PCs. Whole databases or
elements of them were often duplicated on multiple stand-alone PCs. Data
validity for any one instance of a database or data element was questionable.
Synchronization occurred only through labor-intensive manual reviews and
updates. Of similar difficulty was fusing information from various databases to
gain synergistic benefits.
Internet access was non-existent. This was a function of lack of hardware
infrastructure. Inability to access the Internet retarded the squadron in functional
areas such as Naval Air Training and Operating Standards (NATOPS), where
access to other commands' NATOPS Internet web sites containing flight safety
information and training materials is very important. Overall, VP-40's use of IT
was very rudimentary and not well orchestrated. VP-40 was clearly below the IT-
21 standards in every respect.
1
The squadron lacked an IT infrastructure, and
lacked a strategy for establishing and employing one.
Not included in this characterization was the Maintenance Department's Naval Aviation Logistics
Command Information Systems suite. NALCOMIS is a Navy legacy system, sponsored by the Naval Air
Systems Command, solely for management of aircraft maintenance activities in the squadron and interface
with the higher level intermediate maintenance function resident in the NAS, and the supporting NAS
supply department. The intra-squadron maintenance functionality is supported by an Ethernet LAN using a




Information superiority is crucial to U.S. forces' ability to generate combat
power in the future. The Navy's recognition of this is reflected in its shift from
platform-centric to network-centric warfare. Network-centric warfare requires a
new type of infrastructure; one focused on IT rather than ships and aircraft. The
joint CINCLANTFLT-CINCPACFLT initiative known as IT-21 is the plan for
establishing the new IT infrastructure.
In addition to highly capable IT infrastructure, information superiority
demands high quality information. Information quality is a product of the degree
of quality in producing and handling the information as much as it is a product of
the quality of content. That is, in turn, a function of the quality of the design and
application of the IT that supports the process producing the information. Quality
in IT design grows from systematic assessment of functional processes and their
information management requirements.
VP-40 is an example of a Navy unit striving to shape its IT-21
implementation its needs. The squadron began its effort by systematically
assessing how well its current IT meets its information requirements. From this
general baseline, functional areas will be targeted, with those having the highest
potential payoff done first. The Operations Department's flight scheduling
function is a critical function for which carefully designed application of IT-2
1
infrastructure may yield significant benefit.
18
III. ILLUSTRATIVE IT IMPROVEMENT: VP-40 FLIGHT
SCHEDULING
A. INTRODUCTION
The activity of a squadron revolves around operating its aircraft and
training its aircrews. Training aircrewmen, and operating and maintaining aircraft
is a complex endeavor that must be carefully choreographed.
The squadron's operations officer guides the squadron's activity. The flight
schedule is the means by which the operations officer communicates what flight
activity or missions will take place on a daily basis. Flight scheduling, therefore,
is a critical function.
Flight scheduling by its nature is information-intensive. Yet currently, the
function is performed without any significant use of IT. Therefore, the flight
scheduling function is a rich and promising target in VP-40's overall effort to
improve its IT.
B. FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS
1. Background
Proficiency or readiness is a rating of a squadron's ability to perform its
assigned missions. A squadron's assigned missions can cover a number of the
Navy's 13 standard Primary Mission Areas (PMAs). A squadron achieves
readiness through training in its applicable PMAs. Squadron readiness is an
aggregate average of individual aircrewmen's readiness. Individual aircrewmen
19
readiness or currency is based on training accomplished in applicable PMAs.
(VonBrabant, 1993)
Achieving and maintaining proficiency requires squadrons to constantly
train - primarily by flying their aircraft, but with use of flight simulators as well.
Normally training is conducted in a 24-month cycle. During the cycle, readiness
level requirements for applicable PMAs vary according to the PMA and point in
time in the squadron's cycle. At 1 8 months, the goal is for the squadron to be at
maximum readiness. Usually at this point the squadron begins a six-month
operational deployment. Maximum readiness is the goal because during the
deployment, higher level commanders might call upon the squadron to perform
any or all of its missions. (VonBrabant, 1993)
2. What Shapes a Squadron's Schedule
Specific training requirements are a function of the type and model of
aircraft the squadron flies. Each type and model of aircraft in the Navy has a
prescribed set of training syllabi. The Navy's two most senior commanders who
are responsible for training and equipping operational naval air forces - the
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Naval Air
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet -jointly define the syllabi. (VonBrabant, 1993)
The set of syllabi for a model of aircraft specifies various training events
(or flights) in the PMAs applicable to that aircraft model. Events must be
successfully completed and periodically repeated within a given time frame. As
aircrewmen successfully progress through the syllabi, readiness levels increase
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incrementally. But, achieving greater readiness costs the squadron use of scarce
resources. Restricted resources include: time, people, funding for the cost of
operating aircraft (e.g., fuel, replacement components), materially ready aircraft
(i.e., fully mission capable and partially mission capable), ordnance, and other
assets (e.g., ranges, facilities, other squadrons, ships, etc.). Also, a restriction is
the need to maintain equity in flight time among aircrews and individual
aircrewmen. (VonBrabant, 1993)
3. Prominent Roles in Squadron Flight Scheduling
a. Training Officer
The squadron training officer establishes monthly and weekly
training plans. The basis of the plans is the prescribed set of syllabi pertaining to
the squadron's type and model of aircraft. Training plans tailor the execution of
the squadron's syllabi by accounting for the squadron's current aircrew
proficiency, combat readiness and point in the training cycle relative to goals not
yet attained. Training plans are specific guidance to ensure the squadron
progresses satisfactorily in training and achieving readiness goals. The training
officer provides training plans to the squadron operations officer.
b. The Operations Officer
The operations officer is responsible for scheduling flights to meet
training plans. He must formulate schedules on two temporal horizons: daily for
the current week, and several weeks to months in the future.
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(1) Long-Term Planning. On a monthly basis as a long
range scheduling aid, the operations officer usually publishes an operations
forecast. Normally it covers from the next week to at least several months, and
often up to 12 months or more. For ease of use, its most often in the form of a
planning calendar. The blocks of days and weeks display important events, such
as major training exercises and operational commitments, on the dates on which
they are to occur. Also, the calendar often lists the number of aircraft required for
each event, and special equipment or configurations.
(2) Short-Term Planning: Flight Scheduling. The
current week's operations, on a day-to-day basis, are the focus of flight scheduling.
Daily, the operations officer produces a detailed flight schedule. A flight schedule
is the operations officer's plan for employing aircraft and aircrews to accomplish
specific missions. Missions may be for training or real-world operations. The
flight schedule should reflect optimal mission accomplishment within constrained
resources under a number of conditions. Flight scheduling is an optimization
problem. In peacetime, the ongoing daily challenge is to maximize the squadron's
combat readiness given limited resources, and a complex set of variables whose
values constantly change.
4. Flight Scheduling Process Overview
a. Input
Input into the flight scheduling process falls into to general
categories: requirements and resources. Both are constraints and form the bounds
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within which the operations officer must attempt to maximize the squadron's
progress in combat readiness for that day.
(1) Requirements . Requirements define exactly what is
to be accomplished by flying the aircraft. Requirements may be training or
operational. In a peacetime environment, most requirements will concern training,
however some may be operational in nature. Training requirements focus on
incremental improvement or periodic refreshment of particular skills in PMAs.
An implicit requirement is to advance every aircrewmen's skills (i.e., equitable use
of resources in training aircrews). Operational requirements are whatever higher
authority dictates (e.g., anti-drug surveillance patrol).
(2) Resources . Input about resources defines the limits of
various assets available to the squadron with which to satisfy requirements.
Resources primarily are aircraft, funding and personnel. Other resources may be
special equipment and supporting facilities.
b. Transformation
Input starts a complex process. The operations officer must
simultaneously consider multiple constraints, conditions and goals. Sometimes
variables have subtle interrelationships, and so seemingly straightforward choices
may have unanticipated ancillary affects. Some requirements have a degree of
flexibility as to when they must be scheduled to occur. Further complicating the
process is the limited time in which flight scheduling is performed (i.e., less than a
23
day for a daily schedule). Transforming input into an optimum training flight
schedule is a daunting task.
The operations officer acts as an arbiter more than as a unilateral
decision-maker. Often, the operations officer seeks additional information or
advice from those providing the original input, as they are the subject matter
experts for their areas of input. This is particularly true regarding requirements for
which there is some schedule flexibility.
The operations officer must have maximum opportunity to
collaborate with others and to perform sensitivity analyses (on singular choices as
well as a proposed flight schedule). Shaping an optimum flight schedule is
iterative, collaborative and evolutionary.
c. Output - the Flight Schedule
The product of the process, of course, is a daily flight schedule.
5. Complexity of Flight Scheduling for a Long-Range Maritime
Patrol Squadron
For a long-range maritime patrol squadron like VP-40, the problem of flight
scheduling is particularly complex. In addition to the basic variables of flight
scheduling common to all squadrons - which assume a single-pilot aircraft -
described earlier, a patrol squadron has the additional dimension of a large, multi-
man aircrew. Each P-3 patrol aircraft requires a complement of 12 aircrewmen,
including officers (pilots and naval flight officers) and enlisted sailors. The
squadron has up to eight aircraft. There is at least one 1 2-man aircrew per aircraft.
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Each individual aircrewmen has unique training requirements based on the
assigned role aboard the P-3. Plus, each 12-man crew as an entity has training
requirements it must achieve as one.
The multitude of variables in a patrol squadron makes the process of
optimally scheduling flights demanding. This rigorous task must be performed
daily to produce a schedule for the upcoming day's events, plus one additional
time per week to produce a weekly schedule for the upcoming week.
C. VP-40'S FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS
VP-40's flight scheduling occurs in the context and follows the basic
process described in the previous section's overview. Although the process is
information-rich, VP-40 does not currently employ any significant IT in flight
scheduling.
1. Logical Overview
Data flow diagrams, a tool of information systems analysis and design, can
help illustrate the logic of VP'40's flight scheduling process. The context diagram





























Figure 3.1. VP-40 Flight Scheduling Logical Context Diagram
Figure 3.2, a level-one decomposition diagram, models the process in greater









































Figure 3.2. VP-40 Flight Scheduling Level-One Logical Decomposi-
tion Diagram
2. The Physical Process
Input enters the flight scheduling process in hardcopy form. However,
some input is entered into PC applications for intermediate transformation. The
product is electronically stored, but then used in hardcopy form for the remainder
of the flight scheduling process. Failure to electronically capture or use input that
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was intermediately transformed on a PC is due primarily to the squadron's limited
IT infrastructure.
a. Input
In a normal, peacetime environment, the flight scheduling process,
in its current physical implementation, has up to nine inputs. Three flows of input
are intermediately transformed and stored using PC-based application software.
The resultant output, however, is hardcopy reports that are used in that form
through the remainder of the flight scheduling process. The intermediate sub-
processes' software applications are not integrated with each other, or, with the
flight scheduling process.
(1) Training Plans . The training officer produces
monthly and weekly training schedules. Weekly plans figure most prominently in
daily flight scheduling. Training plans are print products.
(2)
"Ops Planner." The Ops Planner is a rolling
schedule of major events in the coming two to three months. The operations
officer produces it using Softkey's Calendar Creator software. The format of the
planner is a planning calendar. The blocks of days and weeks display important
flight schedule-impacting squadron events on the dates on which they are to occur.
Typically, events include major training exercises, operational commitments and
scheduled maintenance of an aircraft that will last a day or more. The Ops Planner
sets the framework within which to formulate future week's daily flight schedules.
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(3) " Flight Hours Tracker." The Flight Hours Tracker
is a spreadsheet that is produced using Microsoft's Excel software on a stand-alone
PC in the operations department. The Flight Hours Tracker is used as a means by
which to monitor funds authorized and spent for fuel, and the number of hours the
squadron has flown. From that information, the Tracker computes total funding
and spending for the current fiscal quarter and year, the squadron's cost per flight
hour of operating its P-3s based on fiscal-year-to-date total funds spent and hours
flown. The Tracker also computes the estimated flight hours that can be flown for
the remainder of the quarter (based on remaining authorized funds for the quarter
and the fiscal-year-to-date cost per flight hour). The projected flight hours that
can be flown for the rest of the quarter is important input information for flight
scheduling. Using this figure, the target average for daily flight hours that should
be scheduled can be computed.
(4)
"
Pilot Proficiency Training Tracker." The Pilot
Proficiency Training (PPT) Tracker is also a spreadsheet that is produced using
Microsoft's Excel software on a stand-alone PC in the operations department. The
PPT Tracker monitors pilots' progress toward completing required minimum
training. Information from the PPT Tracker is used in daily flight scheduling as a
guide for equitably allocating flight hours among pilots.
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(5) Flight Schedule Input. Flight schedule input from
aircrewmen comes in two forms: flight time summary sheets and flight schedule
input forms.
(a) Flight Time Summary Sheet. This is the means
by which a pilot records actual flight time at the end of a mission and
communicates it to the operations officer.
(b) Flight Schedule Input Form. The flight
schedule input form provides to aircrewmen a means by which to provide input to
the operations officer for inclusion into the flight scheduling process. It may be
used to request that an event be scheduled or that a scheduled event be changed.
The form is simple, data is handwritten on it and the printed form is physically
submitted to the operations department.
(6) Aircraft Maintenance . VP-40's aircraft maintenance
department provides a daily forecast to the operations officer about aircraft
availability and capability for the coming day. The forecast identifies which
aircraft are anticipated to be flyable and which are not, as well as information
about degraded aircraft sub-systems on all aircraft.
(7) Personnel Administration . VP-40's administration
department provides input daily to the operations officer. Input concerns
personnel who are not available for assignment to flight events due to their
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absence from the squadron (e.g., temporary assignment to duties outside of the
squadron, leave or liberty).
(8) Medical and Dental Readiness . Input from medical
and dental is sporadic. Input may be in verbal or e-mail message form as well as
written form. Usually, input is the result of an aircrewman reporting to the
squadron flight surgeon or the supporting NAS's medical or dental department
with an acute health problem. If the doctor, using standard Navy guidance, deems
the condition sufficiently serious, he may temporarily remove the aircrewman
from flight status; in that case, the medical or dental department immediately
advises the squadron. Also, but less frequently, an aircrewman can be removed
from flight status if certain periodic examinations are not completed on time.
(9) Input from CPW-10. Input from the staff of
Commander, Patrol Wing 10 can come verbally in a meeting or conference or in
the form of a telephone call, a memorandum or e-mail message.
b. Transformation
The operations officer is the focal point of eight streams of input,
and ultimately must transform them into a flight schedule. However, the
operations officer seldom acts unilaterally in that transformation.
Most often, the operations officer collaborates with those who have
input into the flight scheduling process. But, the process is not truly collaborative;
that is, it is rare that all parties simultaneously participate. Collaboration is usually
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limited to a series of two-party communications between the operations officer
and one of the other concerned parties at a time. (Flight scheduling is not
normally done by conference as having five to seven daily flight schedule
meetings plus an additional one every week to consider the upcoming weekly
schedule is not practicable.)
Transforming input into a flight schedule is not a single linear
process, but more akin to a parallel process that is iteratively performed.
Competing requirements and the resources needed to satisfy them must compared
on the bases of relative importance and timing.
c. Flight Schedule
The product of the flight scheduling process, of course, is a flight
schedule. A flight schedule provides detail concerning flight missions or evencs to
be flown for the day. It contains information such as the identity of the specific
aircraft, the aircrew flying it, aircrewmen functional station assignments for the
flight, purpose of the mission, locations (takeoff, intermediate stops, and final
destination), and times (pre-flight briefing, pre-flight inspection and preparation of
the aircraft, takeoff and landing). Currently, VP-40 publishes the flight schedule in
hardcopy printed form.
D. SHORTCOMINGS OF VP-40'S FLIGHT SCHEDULING PROCESS
Logically, the process is sound. However, the process' information
management is wholly inadequate in the context of today's commonly available
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PC and LAN IT. What little IT that is now used in the flight scheduling process is
rudimentary - word processing, spreadsheets and a calendar - limited in the
degree to which it is applied, and not integrated.
Communicating, handling and manipulating information throughout the
process is primarily via printed media. Input in such form, by nature of its
physical properties, is inherently slow. Also, printed input is subject to physical
barriers; that is, if the operations officer and the input sources are not in close
proximity to one another, communicating input is very difficult.
Once in hand, input is difficult to use as it cannot be readily manipulated or
melded with other input. Using information in hardcopy form is inefficient and
requires too much of the operations officer's time and talents in the input phase.
The time and effort the operations officer must spend on input is detrimental to
optimizing the flight schedule, the process' most important aspect.
Finally, process output, a printed flight schedule, has the same negative
qualities as input: inherently slow and difficult to disseminate.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Flight scheduling is an essential function of a squadron. It is the process
whereby resources and mission requirements are matched in order to produce
maximum affect. In a normal peacetime environment, training requirements drive
flight schedules. Training requirements are set forth by higher authority in syllabi
for each type and model of aircraft.
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The syllabi for the aircraft that a squadron flies forms the foundation upon
which its training plans are built, and in turn its flight schedules. Flight scheduling
is the responsibility of the squadron's operations officer.
Flight scheduling represents an optimization problem. Requirements must
be maximally satisfied within certain constraints.
In VP-40, transformation of input into a proposed flight schedule is almost
entirely a manual process.
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IV. INFORMATION SPECIFICATIONS FOR FLIGHT
SCHEDULING IN VP-40
A. INTRODUCTION
The process VP-40 uses to formulate flight schedules is sound. However,
as the process is currently executed, its information quality - in terms of
efficiency, timeliness, and accuracy (to the degree it is affected by timeliness) -
could be significantly improved through the use of IT. Information formats (not to
be confused with forms of media) and content are adequate. This chapter
discusses why improving execution of flight scheduling is desirable, and describes
the information requirement specifications for doing so.
B. NEED FOR IT IN FLIGHT SCHEDULING
Historically, abundant funding for flight hours and high rates of aircraft
mission capability aircraft were a hedge against less than optimal flight schedules.
Flight schedules not producing maximum utility per flight hour were of minor
consequence. Whatever a particular schedule did not accomplish could be readily
compensated for in later flight schedules. That is no longer the case. Reduced
budgets for the Flying Hour Program (FHP), aircraft maintenance and spare
components have increasingly limited flight hours available and degraded aircraft
material readiness. Now, limited resources make it imperative that flight
schedules be optimal. Furthermore, it is important that the process be efficient and
agile. "Having the right information delivered to the right place at the right time
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will reduce planning timelines, [and] improve course of action development."
(NVI, 1997)
VP-40's flight scheduling process delivers the right kind of information, but
is cumbersome and slow. When the quality of the information is assessed using
the information quality criteria and measures that were discussed in Chapter II
(i.e., including attributes in addition to content such as timeliness and
accessibility), it is found to be lacking. The information quality of flight
scheduling can be improved, however, by using IT to improve process execution.
Using IT can increase the speed and efficiency of flight scheduling by eliminating
manual procedures. This would enable the operations officer to focus more on the
most important aspect of the process: optimization. Also, if the time required to
produce a flight schedule is shortened, then flight scheduling becomes more
responsive because it yields more time-relevant information.
1. Optimization
While optimization was always one of the goals in schedule writing, it was
not the overriding goal. Whatever time and effort the operations officer could
afford to apply to optimization was generally sufficient. That is no longer the
case. Now, the operations officer's primary focus and effort as he formulates a
weekly or daily flight schedule for the squadron must be on optimization.
Yet, the operations officer does not have additional time to spend on
optimization. Spending more time on optimization means spending less time on
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some other aspect of flight scheduling. In order to devote more time and effort to
optimization, the operations officer must effectively buy time by gaining
efficiency in other aspects of the process. An aspect of the process that is
particularly inefficient and from which significant time and effort could be
reclaimed by using IT is information handling. Currently, just gathering,
formatting, validating, and organizing input information is tediously manual and
requires significant time and effort by the operations officer. Such tasks are
classic areas for IT application.
2. Responsiveness
Improving the agility of flight scheduling is important not only so the
operations officer can focus on optimizing schedules, but also so the process can
be more responsive. Limited resources make planning for maximal utility of flight
hours, aircraft and aircrews all of the time - in stable, predictable times as well as
in fast-paced, dynamic times - more important. Changes in requirements or
resources must be readily accommodated by the flight scheduling process.
Currency of input information should not impinge on process effectiveness and
optimality of schedules, but rather enhance both.
C. SPECIFICATIONS
Improving the accuracy, agility and responsiveness of the flight scheduling
process is possible through use of IT. But, IT must be applied with forethought of
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purpose. Doing so means specifying what the desired salient characteristics of
information quality in flight scheduling.
What are the specifications for information quality for VP-40's process of
flight scheduling? Using the information quality attributes and descriptions
provided in Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control,
Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations and in
the Navy's ITSG (presented earlier in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 respectively), a set of
attributes was formulated. Table 4.1 presents the specifications.
INFORMATION QUALITY ATTRIBUTES FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULING
COMPLETENESS All necessary elements required by the operations officer to
make fully informed scheduling decisions about aircraft and
aircrew employment.
PRECISION The degree to which reality (i.e., resources available, constraints
imposed, and conditions existing) is accurately conveyed;
inherent characteristics are fidelity, granularity, brevity, and
relevance.
USABILITY The degree to which information is in a standardized, easily
understood format.
ACCESSIBILITY The degree to which needed information is readily available to
the operations officer.
CURRENCY The time delay between a fact of reality and its reflection as an
element of information in the flight scheduling information
system.
ECONOMY The time, effort and expense of accessing, handling or
producing information.
SECURITY The degree of adequacy in which information is protected from
compromise, corruption or improper devolution.
Table 4.1. Information Quality Attributes for Flight Scheduling
From this set of desired specifications two subsets were identified: those
specifications now being adequately met, and those not being adequately met by
the current flight scheduling process. Those not being met are where the
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implementation of IT in flight scheduling must be focused first. Table 4.2
displays specifications for IT-21 implementation as it concerns flight scheduling
and those that are now being satisfied (but could be considered for IT-based
enhancement in the future).












Table 4.2. Information Quality Attributes to be Targeted for
Improvement Via IT
In summary, VP-40's flight scheduling process lacks quality in how it
moves and manipulates information, not in its information content. Consequently,
IT-based improvement must focus on improving the process' handling of
information, especially input (i.e., consolidating and validating input, and fusing
input from multiple sources).
The following describes the performance that is expected of the IT that is
intended to improve the flight scheduling process. Categorizing performance in
distinct attribute categories is somewhat artificial, however. There are inter-
dependencies among attributes, and therefore performance.
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1. Accessibility
Generally, accessibility to information flowing into and out of the flight
scheduling process must be ubiquitous via the squadron's LAN. Time, day or
geographic location should not limit access. Access should be available locally by
hard-wire connection to the LAN, or remotely by Internet or modem.
a. Input
Accessibility to input information with respect to content should be
limited via a permission mechanism controlled by the operations officer using a
"need-to-know" basis. Individuals and activities routinely having input into the
flight scheduling process must be able to offer new input or review input already
made without restriction. The operations officer must have on-demand access to
input information for flight scheduling. The repository from which the
information is drawn is immaterial. Access could be via a central repository in
which input for any given future flight schedule is accumulated until requested by
the operations officer, or via access to distributed repositories of such information
(e.g., one for every squadron department having input). In any event, there should
be no latency in input once the operations officer requests it. Also implied, is no
human intervention be required between the operations officer indicating he is
ready for input information and receiving it (i.e., no translation from one form of
media to another). Ideally, input the operations officer could readily assimilate
information, however, intermediate reformatting would be acceptable as long as it
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requires no additional effort (i.e., an automatic reformatting mechanism via
software).
b. Output: The Flight Schedule
Once the operations officer has formulated and published a flights
schedule, squadron members and authorized individuals and activities outside of
VP-40 (e.g., CPW-10, the NAS Whidbey Island Operations Department) must
have access to flight schedules. Level of detail would be controlled in a fashion to




Input latency compromises the relevance of flight schedules. As the
amount of time required for incorporating input into the process increases, the
probability that the input is no longer accurate increases. Therefore, a flight
schedule based on aged input may not be relevant to the reality of the flight
schedule time period (i.e., day or week).
Input should not be a discrete event, but rather a continuous one.
There is no need for an explicit or implicit request for input. The data required,
and its formats and forms are known and constant. Only the data elements' values
change. Periodicity of input incorporation is also known (i.e., flight schedules are
written weekly and daily). In short, the input requirement is a standing,
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continuous one. The operations officer's consideration of the input in his decision
making is a discrete event. Input should constantly flow from its sources so that at
any given time the operations officer can produce a flight schedule for a future day
or week based on what is known at that time. Any input made, but not entering
the process before it begins, could simply be queued for the next flight scheduling
evolution. Input should flow without human intervention or assistance, or regard
to its time or place of origination.
b. Flight Schedule Output
Flight schedules should be produced and incorporate the latest input
up until the time execution begins or has progressed to a point where changing the
flight schedule is moot. Once a flight schedule has been produced, validated and
approved for publication by the operations officer, it should be immediately
available to all concerned. Published schedules should reflect reality as accurately
as possible and be updated as changes in input factors dictate.
3. Economy
Information's format and form largely drive the effort and expense of
accessing, handling or transforming it. The most economical formats are those
that are standard so as to preclude reformatting. The most economical form or
medium is electronic data because of its wide coverage, timely and inexpensive
transmission. VP-40's flight scheduling information should be in standard formats
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exchanged and manipulated using PC-based means (e.g., the squadron LAN,
software).
a. Input
The format and form of input must be usable upon receipt in the
Operations Department. Input should be entered only once, at the source, and be
usable in flight scheduling from that point onward. Readily usable input form
fosters speed. Speed reduces required lead-time for the process to produce a flight
schedule. Reduced lead-time means that flight schedules can incorporate more up-
to-date information. Flight schedules based on more recent information are more
relevant and require fewer changes. In the end, all-electronic form can add value
to flight schedules.
b. Transformation
This is the process of melding input together (accumulating, sorting,
and weighting) to distill a preliminary flight schedule serving as the framework
within which the operations officer performs sensitivity analysis and optimization.
Synthesizing a flight schedule is often a collaborative process. While
collaboration is not always necessary or desired, it must be an option. Deployed
squadron detachments at remote sites, or key personnel such as department heads,
the executive officer or the commanding officer should be easily included in the
flight schedule decision making process despite their geographic location.
Collaboration helps stabilize quality and improve timeliness of flight schedules.
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c. Flight schedule output
The format and form of published flight schedules should facilitate
display on PC monitors of various sizes as a Web page, and should be easily
printed. Also, the format must be readily alterable to facilitate any long-term
changes in flight schedule information content.
4. Security
Within the scope of this thesis, security concerns the integrity of flight
schedule information during routine, peacetime operations, and it does not concern
the protection of classified information. Security of flight schedule information
must be provided (e.g., via permissions for accessibility and alteration of
information) and it must be controllable by the operations officer.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Increasingly scarce flight hours and mission-capable aircraft compel VP-40
to seek maximum utility of those resources. Optimal flight schedules have never
been more important. Yet, the operations officer cannot afford to devote more of
his time or effort to optimization. To do so, the inefficient, time-consuming
techniques for handling information in the process must be replaced. The process
must be executed more quickly and economically. Such needs lend themselves to
common PC-based IT solutions.
Successful introduction of IT into any process is based upon information
management requirements. In the case of VP-40's flight scheduling process, the
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basic requirement is assuring information quality. Information quality is a
function of information content and of how information is handled as it traverses a
process. VP-40's scheduling process has adequate information content. However,
information manipulation relative to the attributes defined in Table 4.1 is
inadequate. The introduction of IT must target information accessibility, currency,
economy and security.
Establishing a good IT infrastructure for handling information can also
serve as the basis for introducing more sophisticated applications of IT in the
flight scheduling process later (e.g., a decision support system).
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V. IT- 21 MAPPED TO THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFICATIONS FOR VP-40*S FLIGHT SCHEDULING
PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The information requirements for VP-40's flight scheduling process, as
presented in Chapter IV, can be met using components of IT-21. Using IT-21's
LAN architecture and some of its application software, the quality of information
in the flight scheduling process can be improved in terms of accessibility,
currency, economy and security. Such improvements would enable collaborative
work capability that could increase process speed and the optimality of flight
schedules. Speed would accrue simply from physical information flows being
replaced with electronic information flows. Better flight schedules would be
possible through the collaborative work capability.
B. MAPPING IT-21 COMPONENTS TO INFORMATION REQUIRE-
MENTS
The flight scheduling process of VP-40 can be improved with IT. Merely
implementing the IT presented in IT-21 will not improve flight scheduling.
However, specific IT components of IT-2 1 implemented based on the specified
information management requirements of flight scheduling can improve the
overall process.
1. Hardware
The specifications for hardware components under IT-21 are
straightforward as set forth in the joint CINCLANTFLT-CINCPACFLT message
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that formally announced IT-21 (see Appendix). By procuring and installing a set
of hardware components based upon the information requirements, VP-40 can
produce flight scheduling process improvements.
a. Home Base
Using IT-21 -specified hardware, the minimum architecture that is
required for improving the process of flight scheduling would be a LAN that links
at least all of the primary participants involved in the process. Necessary
hardware would include a Fast Ethernet LAN that would link a server and the PCs
of each of the key figures in the flight scheduling process (i.e., the CO, XO,
operations officer, training officer, NATOPS officer, aircraft maintenance officer,
personnel officer and medical officer). Such a LAN would enable those
individuals in VP-40 who are integral in the flight scheduling process to readily
access information essential to the process. Information currency would increase
because facts could be shared over the LAN with virtually no delay. Economy
would increase because sharing information electronically requires very little
effort or time. Security of flight scheduling information would increase because
the LAN, when coupled with the NOS (discussed later), would allow the
operations officer to dictate access rights.
b. Squadron Detachments and Individual Personnel On Travel
VP-40 often deploys detachments of one or more aircraft to other
sites, or sends individuals on travel who are key in the flight scheduling process.
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In either case the geographic separations, sometimes spanning multiple time
zones, reduce the efficacy of flight scheduling for the squadron overall. The
deleterious affect of time and distance on the information flows and collaborative
work of the flight scheduling process could be ameliorated by remote access
capability to the VP-40 LAN. For this purpose, the LAN should have remote
access capability, and a small pool of notebook PCs should be available for
detachment officers-in-charge and other essential personnel to use via telephonic
dial-in.
2. Software
Of the software product set specified by IT-21, use of Microsoft's Windows
NT and Office 97 can improve the quality of information in VP-40's flight
scheduling process relative to the information requirements that were identified in
chapter IV. Accessibility, currency and economy can improve through use of
Office and Exchange. Security - not in terms of protecting classified information,
but rather integrity of unclassified information commonly used in flight scheduling
- can be enhanced through the use of the Windows NT NOS.
a. Windows NT
Windows NT is required because it is the NOS on which the LAN
would run. Windows NT provides the common environment from which the
applications of the Microsoft product set would run and be shared among users.
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Beyond that, Windows NT can enable the operations officer to better control the
integrity of flight schedule information.
(1) Domain Security Model . The Windows NT domain
security model provides a number of security features. A domain is "an
arrangement of client server computers referenced by specific name that share a
single security permission database." (Strebe, Perkins and Chellis, 1997) The
domain security model "governs the interactions of clients and Windows NT
servers in a server-based network with a Windows NT server coordinating the
security of the network." (Strebe, Perkins and Chellis, 1997) In domains, network
user accounts are centrally managed.
(2) Security Features. Each user has prescribed
privileges by virtue of the user's individual privileges and those accorded through
the user's membership in domain groups. Each object (e.g., files and directories)
within Windows NT has an access control list (ACL). An ACL contains
information that identifies users and groups who are authorized access to the
object and the type of access that they have. In Windows NT, resources can be
designated as shared network resources available to all users. Those resources that
are shared have permissions that control the type of access that is permitted via the
network (but not locally). Finally, the Windows NT file system (NTFS) has a set
of permissions that can be used to further fine-tune security at the file level. The
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security features of Windows NT can enable VP-40's operations officer the means
by which to ensure a higher degree of integrity of flight scheduling information.
b. Office 97
The Office 97 group of software applications, when used in a LAN
environment can enable communication and collaboration in an information
process. Those capabilities influence the management of information in terms of
accessibility, currency and economy. These three characteristics, as defined in
Chapter IV, are targets for improvement in VP-40's flight scheduling process.
Office 97 can facilitate their improvement.
(1) Results in a Corporate Setting. Office 97 has been
used extensively in corporate settings that have characteristics that are similar to
those of flight scheduling in VP-40; that is, processes which are complex, mission-
critical and time-sensitive that are executed in environments in which conditions
constantly and often rapidly change. Office 97's performance as a communication
and collaboration vehicle was independently studied by International Data
Corporation (IDC) in 1997. IDC surveyed six corporations, from a variety of
industries, having national or global interests. All were early adopters of Office
97. The purpose of the survey was to determine the degree to which Office 97's
communication and collaboration tools enabled the organizations to achieve their
goals in less time, with greater value, and at lower cost. IDC examined how well
Office 97 enabled the corporations to: capture and use information in spite of time
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and distance, manage information, leverage knowledge, reduce duplicate efforts
by sharing information, and make better-informed and faster decisions. Office 97
was found to have significantly helped all six organizations enhance their
knowledge by enabling better sharing and managing of information. In addition,
Office 97 was found to have helped the organizations streamline their processes,
become more competitive and more responsive. (Christianson, 1997) These
results are encouraging. However, because of the small sample size that was used,
it should not be inferred that the Navy, under IT-2 1 , would necessarily benefit to
the same degree.
(2) Using Office 97 to Improve VP-40 fs Flight Schedul-
ing Process. The e-mail capability of Office 97 can enable VP-40's operations
officer to communicate and collaborate with other parties in the flight scheduling
process. Collaboration could expand to include those who are not physically
nearby (provided that the remotely located party has dial-in capability). Locally, it
no longer would require many time-consuming, one-on-one communications (in
person or telephonically) between the operations officer and others. Information
would be communicated and collaboration performed via e-mail messages.
Messages could be one-to-one or one-to-many. The time that could be saved by
doing this alone would be valuable. However, the fact that collaboration could be
performed in much less time could also spur more frequent and rigorous
collaboration. Thus, the flight schedule optimization could be further enhanced.
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Overall, Office 97 would assist the operations officer in harnessing flight
scheduling information and streamlining the process. (Christianson, 1997)
(3) Drawbacks of Using Office 97 for VP-40's Flight
Scheduling Process . Office 97 does not include features that enable one to
control or monitor the progressive flow of collaborative work on documents,
spreadsheets or databases. Office 97 focuses on information creation and retrieval,
but not on the process of information movement. (Christianson, 1997)
C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS
While IT-21 offers some potentially promising means by which VP-40
could improve its flight scheduling process, there are also potential pitfalls
associated with IT-2 1 . Training will be required for users to become proficient in
the use of IT-21's applications software to be able to fully exploit it. For example,
someone must know the various application software systems to be able to create a
LAN based flight scheduling system that is more than an electronic version of
today's paper-based system (e.g., input validation through software is needed).
More crucial, is that at least one person must be trained to configure and maintain
the Windows NT NOS and function as system administrator. Mastering the
Windows NT NOS software, which is essential to operation of the LAN, is not
trivial. It can require hundreds of hours and cost thousands of dollars.
This leads to a second point of concern. The organizational structure of
VP-40 would be affected at a minimum by the need for at least one dedicated
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system administrator. In VP-40 today, there is no billet for such an individual.
However, with other functions taking advantage of the LAN and IT-21 the
efficiencies realized might outweigh the cost in personnel.
D. CONCLUSIONS
IT-21 can improve information quality in VP-40's flight scheduling process.
Information quality relative to an organizational process has two major
components: (1) content and (2) the efficacy with which information is handled.
VP-40's flight scheduling process is adequate in its information content, but is
lacking in how it handles information.
This thesis describes a systematic approach for shaping IT-21 to the flight
scheduling function of VP-40 - that is, "operationalizing" IT-21 in flight
scheduling. This approach could be applied to other functions in the squadron. By
methodically applying the approach in each of the squadron's functions, a mosaic
of information management requirements for IT-21 could be formed. That mosaic
would paint an overall picture of squadron information requirements to shape the
implementation of IT-21 to VP-40's needs. This is important, because while IT-21
provides guidance on the use of hardware and software resources, the precise
information requirements for individual ships and squadrons are not prescribed.
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APPENDIX. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE 21 st CENTURY
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
ROUTINE
R 300944Z MAR 97 ZYB PSN 307047121
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N00//
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SUBJ/TNFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY// POC/M.R.
SCOTT/CDRN6/CINCPACFLT/-/TEL: 808 471-8637// POC/DA.
STRAUB/CDR N6/CINCLANTFLT/-/TEL: 757 322-5863//
RMKS/1 . THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF JOINT CINCPACFLT AND
CINCLANTFLT MESSAGES CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OFIT-21. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES IT-21
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS FOR PROGRAMS
INSTALLING INFORMATION SYSTEMS ON FLEET UNITS/BASES AND PROVIDES
THE FLEET WITH GUIDANCE ON MAINTAINING EXISTING INFORMATION
SYSTEMS UNTIL INSTALLATION OF IT-21 PRODUCTS. THE IT-21
IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS OUTLINED BELOW ARE PROMULGATED IN
ADVANCE OF DON-WIDE GUIDANCE FROM THE DON CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER (CIO). THE DON CIO WILL PROMULGATE DON-WIDE STANDARDS
FOLLOWING NEGOTIATION OF ENTERPRISE-WIDE NETWORK OPERATING
SYSTEMS AND APPLICATIONS.
2. BACKGROUND: INFORMATION SUPERIORITY IS THE FOUNDATION OF
JOINT VISION 2010 BATTLEFIELD DOMINANCE, AS WELL AS THE
WARFIGHTING VISION FOR EACH SERVICE. NETWORK WARFARE, ROBUST
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION TO DISPERSED FORCES
ARE KEY ELEMENTS IN ACHIEVING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY. IT-21 IS
A FLEET DRIVEN REPRIORITIZATION OF C4I PROGRAMS OF RECORD TO
ACCELERATE THE TRANSITION TO A PC BASED TACTICAL/TACTICAL
SUPPORT
WARFIGHTING NETWORK. THE INACTIVATION OF THE CURRENT DOD
MESSAGING SYSTEM (AUTODIN) BY DEC 99, WITH NO PLANNED NAVY
PNFRASTRUCTURE REPLACEMENT, MANDATES THE RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF
THIS WARFIGHTING NETWORK.
3. COMMERCIAL NETWORK OPERATING SYSTEMS (NOS) AND E-MAIL
PRODUCTS HAVE ACHIEVED FUNCTIONAL PARITY. THE FLEETS CANNOT
CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A MULTITUDE OF DIVERSE OPERATING SYSTEMS AND
E-MAIL PRODUCTS WITH THEIR OWN TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
AND TROUBLESHOOTING REQUIREMENTS. THE DOD JOINT TECHNICAL
ARCHITECTURE (JTA) AND DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE COMMON
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
(DII COE) PROVIDE DOD WITH THE AIS SYSTEM GUIDANCE REQUIRED TO
TAKE THE NAVY INTO THE 2 1ST CENTURY. THIS CONVERGENCE OF
SOLUTIONS, PROBLEMS AND GUIDANCE PROVIDES THE IMPETUS TO
ESTABLISH MINIMUM
NAVY AIS STANDARDS AT THIS TIME. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY
REQUIRES ALL NON-STANDARD NOS AND E-MAIL PRODUCTS BE REPLACED
NLT DEC 99.
A. WINDOWS NT SERVER 4.0 IS THE STANDARD FLEET NOS. IT WILL
SOON BE FOLLOWED BY WINDOWS NT 5.0. WINDOWS NT SERVER 4.0 IS DII
COE COMPLIANT.
B. MS EXCHANGE IS DESIGNATED AS THE STANDARD E-MAIL SOLUTION
FOR BOTH FLEETS TO ENSURE AN INTEROPERABLE SECURE MESSAGING
SYSTEM IS OPERATIONAL PRIOR TO AUTODIN INACTIVATION NLT DEC 99.
C. MS OFFICE 97 IS DESIGNATED AS THE STANDARD FLEET OFFICE
SOFTWARE.
D. EXPENDITURE OF OPERATING FUNDS TO MAINTAIN EXISTING IT-21
NONCOMPLIANT NOS AND APPLICATIONS SHALL BE THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM
NECESSARY TO MEET OPERATING REQUIREMENTS UNTIL IT-21
NOS/SOFTWARE IS INSTALLED EVEN IF TEMPORARY LAN DEGRADATION
OCCURS. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS DRIVE HARDWARE STANDARDS.
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE PURCHASED TODAY MUST BE CAPABLE OF MEETING
MISSION REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE YEAR 2000.
4. CINCPACFLT AND CINCLANTFLT ARE ACTIVELY WORKING WITH OPNAV
ON IT-21 FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS. IN GENERAL, AFLOAT
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IT-21 IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE LINKED TO DEPLOYING BATTLEGROUPS
AND ASHORE IT-21 WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A PHASED APPROACH.
SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES WILL BE PROMULGATED AT A LATER
DATE. CINCPACFLT AND CINCLANTFLT ARE TRANSITIONING TO WINDOWS NT
4.0, MS EXCHANGE AND MICROSOFT OFFICE 97. THIS ENVIRONMENT
CANNOT BE OPTIMIZED WITHOUT 32 BIT OPERATING SYSTEMS, HIGH
RESOLUTION
DISPLAYS AND MASS STORAGE. ATM BACKBONE LANS WITH AT LEAST 100
MBS (TCP/IP)TO THE DESKTOP PC WILL BE INSTALLED ON ALL SHIPBOARD
LANS, FLEET HEADQUARTERS (CPF, CLF, TYCOMS, GROUP AND SQUADRON
COMMANDS) AND SHOULD BE INSTALLED IN THOSE SHORE ACTIVITIES THAT
SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS. THIS WILL THEN ALLOW TRANSITION TO
ATM-TO- THE-DESKTOP PC WHEN THE ATM TECHNOLOGY MATURES.
5. SYSTEM COMMANDS AND PROGRAM MANAGERS:
A. NTCSS WILL BECOME THE IT-21 PROGRAM OF RECORD FOR
INSTALLATION OF BOTH SECRET AND UNCLASSIFIED LANS ONBOARD
COMMISSIONED SHIPS. NTCSS (ATIS/SNAP III) LANS INSTALLED FROM
THIS POINT ON WILL HAVE AN ATM BACKBONE, 100 MBS (FAST ETHERNET)
TO THE DESKTOP PC AND THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OUTLINED AT THE END
OF THIS.MESSAGE. THE MIGRATION OF NTCSS LANS TO HIGHER CAPACITY
LANS WILL REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PC'S DELIVERED DURING INITIAL
INSTALLATION. THE TRADE-OFF OF QUANTITY FOR FRONT END PCS IS
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT JV-2010 AND AUTODIN INACTIVATION.
B. SPAWAR IS WORKING WITH NAVSEA TO ENSURE THAT LANS
INSTALLED DURING NEW CONSTRUCTION MEET THE IT-21 REQUIREMENTS.
C. APPLICATION PROGRAM MANAGERS SUCH AS JMCIS, NSIPS, TAMPS,
AND GCSS SHOULD MIGRATE CURRENT APPLICATIONS TO THE DII COE WITH
AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING PC WORKSTATION ACCESS TO ALL
APPLICATION DATA ON AN ENTERPRISE LAN.
D. PROGRAMS INSTALLING INFORMATION SYSTEMS (NEWNET, SMARTLINK,
SMARTBASE, TELEMEDICINE, ETC.) MUST INSTALL COMPONENTS IN FLEET
ACTIVITIES THAT MEET IT-21 STANDARDS AND PROVIDE
INTEROPERABILITY THROUGHOUT THE WARFIGHTING NETWORK.
6. TYCOMS AND THIRD ECHELON COMMANDS SHALL ENSURE THAT:
A. SHIPS AND ACTIVITIES INSTALLING NEW LANS, UNDERGOING
SIGNIFICANT LAN UPGRADES OR THOSE ACTIVITIES WITH STAND ALONE
PC'S SHALL INSTALL IT-21 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE. NEW OR
REPLACEMENT SHIPBOARD AND SHORE BASED TACTICAL LANS SHOULD HAVE
AN ATM BACKBONE WITH AT LEAST 100 MBS (FAST ETHERNET) TO THE PC.
B. SHIPS AND ACTIVITIES WITH EXISTING LANS, WHICH REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT OF UNSERVICEABLE HARDWARE, SHORT OF A FULL NETWORK
UPGRADE, SHALL INSTALL HARDWARE WHICH MEETS IT-21 STANDARDS.
THE NEW EQUIPMENT MAY NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTING LAN
HARDWARE. CINCPACFLT AND CINCLANTFLT BELIEVE THAT ALL AUTOMATED
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AIS) PROCURED MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE
IT-21 LAN STANDARDS EVEN IF TEMPORARY LAN DEGRADATION OCCURS.
THERE IS ONLY SUFFICIENT FUNDING TO DO IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME.
7. THE IT-21 STANDARDS BELOW REPRESENT FRONT END MARKET
TECHNOLOGY, ARE DYNAMIC IN NATURE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE
CLOSELY LINKED TO COMMERCIAL TRENDS. THE STANDARDS LISTED BELOW




(1) AFLOAT LAN STANDARDS - ATM FIBER BACKBONE, 100 MBPS
//
RMKS/
(FAST ETHERNET) TO THE PC.
(2) ASHORE TACTICAL AND HEADQUARTERS COMMAND CENTER STANDARD
(CPF, CLF, TYCOMS, GROUP AND SQUADRON COMMANDS) - ATM BACKBONE,
100 MBPS (FAST ETHERNET) TO THE PC.
(3) ASHORE TACTICAL SUPPORT COMMAND STANDARDS (BASES) - ATM
BACKBONE, 100 MBPS (FAST ETHERNET) TO THE PC.
(4) METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKS (MAN) SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING AT LEAST OC-3 (155MBS).
B. IT-21 SOFTWARE:
- WINDOWS NT 4.0/5.0 WORKSTATION
- MS OFFICE 97 PROFESSIONAL (WORD 97, POWERPOINT 97, EXCEL 97, S
ACCESS 97)
- IBM ANTI VIRUS (NAVY LICENSE, AVAIL FROM NAVCIRT) - MS BACK
OFFICE CLIENT
- MS OUTLOOK 97
- MS EXCHANGE 5.0
- MS IMAGE COMPOSER
C. IT-21 DATABASES. RELATIONAL DATABASES THAT CAN SUPPORT WEB
TECHNOLOGY IAW THE COE (ORACLE, SYBASE, SQL SERVER, ACCESS,
ETC.) WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT DATA REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATION
DEVELOPMENT. ALL PROCESS ENGINEERING INITIATIVES THAT RESULT IN
DESIGN/REDESIGN OF A DATA COLLECTION/CAPTURE SYSTEM MUST USE COE
COMPLIANT RELATIONAL DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (RDBMS)
SOFTWARE. THIS REQUIREMENT IS PROVIDED TO ENSURE RDBMS
INITIATIVES USE COTS APPLICATION SOFTWARE. FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ON RELATIONAL DATABASES CONTACT CDR SANDY BUCKLES,
CPF N67, COMM/DSN (808) 474-6384, NIPRNET
U67@CPF-EMH.CPF.NAVY.MIL.
D. MINIMUM IT-21 PC CAPABILITIES: CPF CAN CURRENTLY PURCHASE
THE IT-21 STANDARD PC WITH SOFTWARE FOR $3250.00 - $3579.00 -
SEE PARA 7(H) AND 7(1).
- 200 MHZ PENTIUM PRO CPU
- 64 MB EDO RAM
- 3.0 GB HARD DRIVE
- 3.5 INCH FLOPPY DISK DRIVE
- 8X IDE CD-ROM
- DUAL PCMCIA/PC CARD READER
- PCI VIDEO W/2MB RAM
- 17 INCH MONITOR (1280 X 1024)
- POINTING DEVICE (TRACKBALL OR MOUSE)
- SOUNDBLASTER (COMPATIBLE) AUDIO CARD WITH SPEAKERS KEYBOARD -
CPU COMPATIBLE 100 MBPS FAST ETHERNET NIC




- 32 MB EDO RAM
- 12.1 IN SVGA ACTIVE MATRIX COLOR DISPLAY - 2.1 GB EIDE HDD
- 6X INTERNAL CD-ROM
- MODEM, PCMCIA SLOTS, NIC CARD
- SMART LITHIUM BATTERY
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F. IT-21 NT FILE SERVER FOR DIRECTORY NETWORK SERVICE:
APPROXIMATELY $26K - SEE PARA 7(H). THESE ARE MINIMUM
SPECIFICATIONS. NEEDS OF THE SPECIFIC NETWORK WILL DICTATE
REQUIREMENTS.
- DUAL 166 MHZ PENTIUM CPU
- 5 12K SECONDARY CACHE MEMORY- 256 MB RAM - TWO 4 GB SCSI HDD
- ONE 6 GB DAT DRIVE
- ONE 3.5 INCH FLOPPY DISK DRIVE
- 6X SCSI CD-ROM
- DUAL PCMCIA/PC CARD READER
- 2 DPT SCSI III CACHING CONTROLLERS (SMARTCACHE 4) - PCI VIDEO
W/2MB RAM
- 17 INCH MONITOR (1280 X 1024)
- POINTING DEVICE (TRACKBALL OR MOUSE) - KEYBOARD
- TWO CABLETRON CPU COMPATIBLE ATM NIC CARDS
- ANTEC DUAL POWER SUPPLY CASE (HOT SWAPPABLE)
G. IT-21 FILE SERVER/APPLICATION SERVER: APPROXIMATELY $26K -
SEE PARA 7(H). SAME AS IT-21 NT FILE SERVER FOR DIRECTORY
NETWORK SERVICE WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:
- CHANGE HDD RQRMT TO FIVE 4 GB DRIVES - CHANGE DAT TO 1 8 GB.
H. PRICES FOR PC TECHNOLOGY ARE CONSTANTLY CHANGING AND CAN
VARY GREATLY DEPENDING ON METHOD OF PROCUREMENT. FOR EXAMPLE,
ON 28 MAR 97 AN IT-21 PC PURCHASED DIRECTLY FROM A VENDOR COSTS
$3643. GOVERNMENT RATE FOR SMALL PURCHASES (LESS THAN TEN) IS
$3579.
A BULK PROCUREMENT (MORE THAN SEVENTY-FIVE) COSTS $3250. THE
ABOVE PRICES INCLUDE SHIPPING. BULK PROCUREMENTS SHOULD BE MADE
THROUGH THE TYPE COMMANDERS WHEN APPROPRIATE. MR. RICK KOOKER,
CPF N65, COMM/DSN:(808) 474-5882, NIPRNET:
U65@CPF-EMH.CPF.NAVY.MIL IS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST TYCOMS WITH AIS
PROCUREMENT ISSUES.
I. AS NETWORK COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY EVOLVES SOME COMMANDS MAY BE
ABLE TO TRANSITION TO NETWORK COMPUTERS. WHEN CONSIDERING
INSTALLATION OF NETWORK COMPUTERS, TOTAL NETWORK COST MUST BE
EVALUATED. NETWORK COMPUTERS HAVE NOT MATURED SUFFICIENTLY TO
IMPLEMENT THEM IN FLEET PLATFORMS AT THIS TIME.
8. WAIVER REQUESTS FROM THE ABOVE STANDARDS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED
DIRECTLY TO THE RESPECTIVE CPF/CLF N6. POINTS OF CONTACT ARE AS
FOLLOWS:
A. CINCLANTFLT: CDR DEBRA STRAUB AT COMM (757) 322-5863,
NIPRNET: U6@CLF.NAVY.MIL
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